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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Michael appeals, contending that three different errors during 
his trial and sentencing: (1) there was a fatal variance between the charging document 
the jury instructions on the aggravated assault charge; (2) the district court failed to 
give his appropriately-requested instruction on the necessity defense; and (3) the district 
court refused to allow him to challenge the information in the presentence investigation 
report (hereinafter, PSI) at the sentencing hearing. The State responds, contending that 
was no fatal variance, the necessity instruction was not supported by 
evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
surrounding the PSI materials. 
decisions 
However, the State's specific arguments in support of those contentions are not 
relevant to the appropriate analyses of the issues raised in this appeal. This reply is 
necessary to refocus on the appropriate analyses for these issues. Because of those 
three errors, this Court should vacate the judgment and remand this case for a new trial, 
or, at least, remand this case for new sentencing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Detwiler's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether there was a fatal nc""'" the charging document ju 
instructions as they to the charge of aggravated assault 
2. Whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury as to the necessity 
defense. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing allow Mr. Detwiler 
to challenge the information in the PSI, and by refusing to red line information 




There Was A Fatal Variance Between The Charging Document And The Jury 
Instructions As They Related To The Charge Of Aggravated Assault 
As the acknowledges, a variance occurs when "the jury instructions given 
at trial allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more 
alternative theories than alleged in the charging document." (Resp. , p.6 ( citing 
State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410 (1985), and State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166 
(Ct. App. 2004).) Under this rule, since the charging document in this case did not 
allege that Mr. Detwiler had committed assault under the theory of attempted battery 
(see R., p.51 ), and the jury was nevertheless instructed on that theory assault-by-
attempt (R., p.240), there was a variance in this case. Thus, the only question 
remaining is whether this variance is fatal (i.e., constitutes a constructive amendment), 
and so, demands that Mr. Detwiler receive a new trial. 
The State also acknowledges that "[a] constructive amendment occurs if a 
variance alters the charging document to the extent that the defendant is tried for a 
crime of greater degree or a different nature." (Resp. Br., pp.6-7 (citing State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49 (Ct. App. 2003), and State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566 
(Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added)).) However, the State goes on to argue that, 
because the actus reus would be the same under either theory of assault, this variance 
is not a constructive amendment. (Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) 
The first problem with the State's argument on this issue is that it ignores a 
fundamental tenet of criminal law: "In every crime or public offense there must exist a 
union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." I.C. § 18-114 
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(emphasis added). To simply say, as the State has in this case, that the alleged 
conduct would be criminal under either theory because both theories have the same 
actus reus component gives no effect to the intent components of each theory. That is 
inconsistent with the requirement that both act and intent are necessary to show 
criminal conduct. In fact, the State's argument is particularly problematic since the 
State is required to prove the associated intent element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 636 n.5 (1990) (discussing the State's burden of proof 
regarding mens rea elements of a charged offense). As such, adopting the State's 
argument and allowing it to ignore the associated intent components of the theories of 
assault would effectively reduce its burden of proof in such cases, and thus, would 
violate the Constitutional protections of due process and fair trial. See, e.g., State v. 
Keaveny, 136 Idaho 31, 33 (2000). 
The State's argument also fails to recognize that the two theories of assault are 
different in nature because they have different mens rea elements. See, e.g., 
State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 1988). Since the two theories are 
different in nature, the variance is fatal. Assault-by-threat requires that the defendant 
intentionally threaten to do harm which creates a well-founded fear in the victim. 
I. C. § 18-901 (b ). Therefore, the requisite mens rea is that the defendant acted with 
"'an actual intention to cause apprehension."' McDougal/, 113 Idaho at 903 ( quoting 
2 W. Lafave & A. Scott, Jr., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§§ 3.4-3.5 p.316 (1986).) 
There is no requirement that the defendant ever intend to actually cause any harm to 
the victim under the assault-by-threat theory of assault. See id. On the other hand, 
assault-by-attempt requires that the defendant attempt "to commit a violent injury on the 
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person of another." I.C. § 18-901 (a). Therefore, unlike the assault-by-threat theory, the 
requisite mens rea for the assault-by-attempt theory of assault does require that the 
defendant act with "'an intent to cause physical injury to the victim." McDougall, 113 
Idaho at 903 (quoting 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., at p.313). Thus, the mens rea 
requirements for the two alternative theories of assault are different and distinct: there 
is the intention to cause apprehension, and '"the morally worse intention to cause bodily 
harm."' Id. (quoting 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., at p.316); accord State v. Crowe, 135 
Idaho 43, 46 (Ct. App. 2000). This makes the nature of the two theories of assault very 
different. Therefore, because the two theories of assault are different in nature, the 
State's argument that the variance in this case does not require a new trial is erroneous 
and should be rejected. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically discussed this precise 
question, albeit in dicta, and explained that, where the jury instructions add to or alter 
the intent element identified in the charging document, that constitutes a fatal variance. 
State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 725 n.5 (1993). In Tribe, the information accused the 
defendant of "having tortured his wife with an intent to cause suffering or to satisfy some 
sadistic inclination." Id. However, the jury instruction provided that one of the elements 
of the offense was that the defendant "tortured his wife 'with the intent to cause 
suffering, to execute vengeance, to extort something from [her] or to satisfy some 
sadistic inclination."' Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court found that instruction 
to be problematic "because it presented four possibilities to the jury, any one of which 
could be the one upon which the jury reached its verdict. ... This additional language 
further muddies the waters as to whether all twelve jurors agreed that Tribe acted with 
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requisite intent." Id. (emphasis from original). As a result, the Court found that, by 
instructing the jury on potential intent elements that were not included in the charging 
documents, there was "a fatal variance between the instructions and the charge of the 
prosecutor's amended information." /cl. This was true even though the associated 
actus reus would have been the same, regardless of which of the four intents the jurors 
found. 
The discussion in Tribe regarding variances has since been adopted by a 
majority of the Idaho Supreme Court: "When the criminal statute provides different 
ways for committing the crime, the jury instructions should be appropriately tailored to fit 
the allegations in the charging instrument." State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909, 918 (2004) 
(relying on Tribe, 123 Idaho at 731 n.5) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Suriner, 
154 Idaho 81 (2013)). However, the variance in Tiffany was not fatal because no 
evidence had been presented that could have supported the alternative theory of the 
crime included in the jury instructions. Tiffany, 139 Idaho at 917-18. Therefore, there 
was no chance that the jury convicted the defendant on the erroneously-instructed 
theory. Id. Contrarily, as the State has argued in this case, the underlying facts speak 
to both theories of the crime. (Resp. Br., p.13.) Therefore, unlike in Tiffany, there was 
evidence offered on the uncharged alternative theory. 
As a result, the failure to appropriately tailor the jury instructions to fit the means 
alleged in the charging document constitutes a fatal variance. See Tiffany, 139 Idaho at 
918. The jury instruction in this case allowed the jury to convict Mr. Detwiler on a crime 
of a different nature than the one alleged in the charging document. Compare Tribe, 
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123 Idaho at 725 n.5. As even the State concedes (Resp. Br., pp.6-7), when that 
happens, the variance is clear, reversible error. 
Additionally, it is clear that the jurors were discussing the mens rea and intent 
components of the alleged crime. ( See Exhibits, p.28 (the jury's question about the 
evidence necessary to find the requisite intent for aggravated assault).) As such, there 
is a reasonable possibility that, had the jurors been properly instructed, their verdict 
would have been different. Thus, the fact that the district court referred the jurors back 
to the erroneous instruction when they posed a question specifically about the intent 
element demonstrates that there is a reasonable possibility that erroneous instruction 
impacted the verdict in this case. Since that clear error, which touches on Mr. Detwiler's 
constitutional right to a fair trial, was prejudicial, it is fundamental error. See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). Therefore, this Court should vacate 
Mr. Detwiler's conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
II. 
The District Court Erred By Not Instructing The Jury As To The Necessity Defense 
The State's argument as to whether a necessity instruction was required in 
this case is fundamentally flawed because it is entirely based on the presumption 
that Mr. Detwiler's version of events may be wholly discounted in the analysis. 
(See generally Resp. Br., pp.11-14.) For example, the State contends that Mr. Detwiler 
did not present sufficient evidence that he was in danger because, while he testified that 
there was a group of men at his car trying to attack him, Ms. Haynes had testified that 
those men were simply "telling [Mr.] Detwiler to leave the area" and Mr. Detwiler was 
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elements of 
the men. 1 (Resp. , p.13.) 
Mr. Detwiler had not 
on that conflicting testimony, 
sufficient evidence on one of the 
necessity defense (that there was a specific threat of imminent harm). 
(Resp. Br., p.1 ) The State also contends that, because there was evidence 
suggesting that Mr. Detwiler had provoked the situation with the comments he made 
back inside the bar, he had not presented sufficient evidence on another element of the 
defense (that he did not cause the threatening situation). (Resp. Br., 13.) Based on 
these assertions, the State concludes, "[Mr.] Detwiler failed to make a prima facie case 
on each element of his proposed affirmative defense," and so, the district court properly 
refused to the requested instruction. (Resp. Br., p.14.) 
The State's arguments are irrelevant to proper analysis; credibility of the 
witnesses and weight of the evidence is not part of the consideration of whether an 
instruction should be given. "It is a well-settled principle of law that, though the court 
may not believe the testimony of a defendant and witnesses corroborating him, the 
solemn duty rests upon the court to instruct the jury as fairly and impartially upon the 
theory of defense as upon the theory of prosecution." State v. Moultrie, 43 Idaho 766, 
_, 254 P. 520, 523 (1927); accord State v. Scroggie, 110 Idaho 103, 110-11 (Ct. App. 
1986), overruled on other grounds in State v. Porter, 142 Idaho 371, 375 (2005). 
1 The State's summary of Ms. Haynes testimony does not square with Ms. Haynes' 
actual statements. For example, she testified that there was a lot of shouting by the 
men who were surrounding Mr. Detwiler's car, and she had to tell them to back off. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.200, L.25 - p.201, L.22.) In fact, she testified that she did not think it would 
have been safe for Mr. Detwiler to have gotten out of the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.260, Ls.12-
16.) Thus, the State's assertion that the men were simply telling Mr. Detwiler to leave is 
inconsistent with the evidence presented. It also does not account for the boot print that 
was found on the door of Mr. Detwiler's car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.342, Ls.15-17.) 
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As such, when "[t]here was testimony supporting it and, if believed by the jury, would 
have required a verdict of not guilty," the requested instruction should have been given. 
State v. White, 46 Idaho 124, _, 266 P. 415, 418-19 (1928) (citing Moultrie, 43 Idaho 
766); accord State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 247-48 (2008). Thus, the appropriate rule 
is: '"A defendant is entitled to an affirmative instruction applicable to his testimony 
based upon the hypothesis that it is true, when his testimony affects a material issue of 
the case."' State v. Huskinson, 71 Idaho 82, 88 (1951) (quoting Dismore v. State, 
44 P.2d 894, 895 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935)). 
The idea that a defendant should be afforded an instruction "based on the 
hypothesis that it is true" is, of course, premised on the fact that he has presented 
evidence speaking to all the elements of the proposed defense. See, e.g., 
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 (Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, upon presenting 
such evidence, the defendant is entitled to an instruction if, given the hypothesis that his 
evidence is true, there is a possibility that the jury could have returned a not guilty 
verdict. 2 See Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88; cf. State v. Mojica, 95 Idaho 326, 327 (1973) 
(pointing out "[w]hile the defendant presented evidence sufficient for the jury to consider 
his defense of entrapment, [the jurors] were entitled to disbelieve the defendant and to 
rely on the agent's testimony and find for the State on the issue of guilt") (emphasis 
added). Where the district court fails to properly instruct the jury in such cases, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held: "Since no other instructions were given presenting the 
2 This is true even if the jury might ultimately not believe the defendant's evidence, or 
find contradictory evidence more credible. The determination of whether or not to give 
an affirmative defense instruction is assessed presuming that the defendant's evidence 
will be believed. Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88. 
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theory of appellant's defense, we conclude that it was reversible error to deny 
appellant's request to give the [requested] instructions." State v. McGlochlin, 85 Idaho 
459, 466-67 (1963) (quoting Moultrie, 254 P. at 523). 
In this case, Mr. Detwiler's testimony, combined with the other evidence in the 
case (for example, the boot mark on his door and the testimony that it would not have 
been safe for Mr. Detwiler to exit the car) which reinforced Mr. Detwiler's testimony that 
he was being assaulted while he was in his car, was sufficient to allow him to present a 
necessity defense to the jury. There was a reasonable view of the evidence (i.e., if the 
jurors had believed Mr. Detwiler over Ms. Haynes) that supported the requested 
instruction. (See App. Br., pp.12-15 (discussing in detail the evidence presented that 
speaks to each element of the necessity defense).) The State's argument - that, 
because the jury might have believed Ms. Haynes, and so ultimately rejected the 
defense - is simply not a valid reason for the district court to have refused to give the 
instruction in the first place. See, e.g., Moultrie, 254 P. at 523. So long as a reasonable 
view of the evidence would support the instruction (i.e., given the hypothesis that 
Mr. Detwiler's evidence is true), the district court is required to give the instruction. 
State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878 (1996); State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 414 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Similarly, just because there are alternative explanations as to who or what 
triggered the confrontation at the car does not mean that Mr. Detwiler did not present 
sufficient evidence to justify getting the instruction. Rather, there was evidence that 
Ms. Haynes had managed to quell the situation in the bar and Mr. Detwiler was 
packing up his things, preparing to leave, which suggests that, when the people inside 
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the bar followed Mr. Detwiler outside, they were initiating a new confrontation which 
Mr. Detwiler did not instigate. (See App. Br., pp.13-14.) It is the jury's job to determine 
which evidence is ultimately credible, but given the hypothesis that Mr. Detwiler's 
evidence was true, that evidence supports his assertion that he did not cause the 
threatening situation, and therefore, he presented sufficient evidence to merit the 
necessity instruction. Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88; see also Mojica, 95 Idaho at 327. 
The State makes another, related argument directed specifically at Mr. Detwiler's 
assertions about the "least offensive means" element of the necessity defense. 
Specifically, it contends that Mr. Detwiler could have driven safely away, rather than 
driving forward (and thus, towards the alleged victim), and so, Mr. Detwiler failed to 
present sufficient evidence that his actions were the least offensive means to escape 
the potential harm. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) In making that argument, the State 
completely ignores, rather than tries to mitigate against, Mr. Detwiler's testimony. As 
before, that sort of argument is irrelevant to whether the necessity instruction was 
appropriate. 
Mr. Detwiler testified that he did, in fact, try to drive in reverse and leave the 
parking lot, but that doing so did not free him from the threatening situation: 
As soon as [Ms. Haynes] left the area of my car, walked over towards the 
tree, this black guy came up and he opened my car door. And he said, 
"Get the [expletive deleted] out of the car. You're going to get out of the 
car." And he had the door open .... And I put the car in reverse, and 
he started to come closer into my car . ... So I was thinking that [going] 
forward would break this guy away from my door and give me enough 
chance to lock the doors, which is what I did. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.386, L.9 - p.387, L.2 (emphasis added).) Ms. Haynes' testimony supports 
Mr. Detwiler's assertion that he had initially backed up, and then drove forward. 
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(Tr., Vol.4 p.204, Ls.19-23; Tr., Vol.4, p.275, Ls.3-9.) Therefore, contrary to the State's 
assertion, there was evidence indicating that Mr. Detwiler had tried to back out and it 
was unsuccessful in resolving the threatening situation. As a result there is evidence 
that Mr. Detwiler's actions were the "least offensive means" available. 
Since the jury could have believed Mr. Detwiler's account, there was a 
reasonable view of the evidence which supported the instruction. As before, it does not 
matter whether or not the jurors would have ultimately believed Mr. Detwiler's account; 
he was still entitled to have the jury consider his defense based on the evidence 
presented at trial. E.g. Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88; Moutrie, 254 P. at 523. Therefore, 
the State's argument on the "least offensive means" element is similarly irrelevant and 
should be rejected. Because Mr. Detwiler presented sufficient evidence to merit a 
necessity instruction, the district court erred by not giving that instruction. As such, this 
Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial where the 
jury is properly instructed. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Allow Mr. Detwiler To 
Challenge The Information In The PSI, And By Refusing To Redline Information 
Improperly Included Therein 
The State contends that the district court provided Mr. Detwiler with an 
opportunity challenge the contents of the PSI at a continued hearing, and thus, because 
defense counsel decided not to take advantage of that opportunity, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by not allowing Mr. Detwiler to challenge the contents of the PSI 
at the sentencing hearing. (Resp. Br., pp.15-18.) That argument ignores the rule 
clearly articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals: "it is at the sentencing hearing-and 
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not beyond-that the defendant is given the opportunity to object to [the PSl's] 
contents."3 State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296 (Ct. App. 2007). The district court 
made it very clear that it was not going to entertain objections to the contents of the PSI 
at the sentencing hearing: 'Tm not going to red-line or remove anything at this point. 
The PSI says what it says," and "I'm not removing anything at this point from the PSI." 
(Tr., Vol.5, p.27, Ls.12-14; Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.15-16.) In taking that position, the district 
court allowed unreliable information to remain in the PSI. That position is directly 
contrary to the rule from Person, and so, it constitutes an abuse of the district court's 
discretion. 
As such, even if continuing the sentencing hearing were an appropriate option 
under Person, the fact that the district court refused to make note of Mr. Oetwiler's 
challenges at the sentencing hearing which actually took place is still not acceptable. 
Therefore, the State's argument on this issue is meritless and should be rejected. 
Because the district court abused its discretion at the sentencing hearing which actually 
occurred, Mr. Detwiler's sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a new 
sentencing with a proper PSI. See, e.g., State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991); 
State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961 (Ct. App. 2010). 
3 The State has not argued that this rule is erroneous or otherwise contended that it 
should be abandoned. (See generally Resp. Br.) In fact, it has not acknowledged that 
rule at all. .(See generally Resp. Br.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Detwiler respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this 
Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing with an 
instruction to allow him an adequate opportunity to challenge the information in the PSI 
materials. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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